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The first guarantee of racial equality was authorized in 1865 by
the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.' 42
U.S.C. § 1981,2 in its original form, 3 was conceived pursuant to this
landmark amendment 4 in order to ensure the freedom of the then
recently emancipated black man. 5 This statute provides that all persons must have "full and equal benefit[s] [of all laws] . . . as is enjoyed
by white citizens."' 6 Although the Supreme Court has held the statute
to be racial in character,7 the precise boundaries of section 1981,
particularly with respect to the meaning of race, have been in controversy since the statute's conception. 8

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I provides: -Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.'"
2 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
1 Section 1981 was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(enacted Apr. 9, 1866); see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879). The wave of doubt
concerning the constitutionality of the Act which ensued soon after its enactment led, in part, to
the passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 Mico. L. REV. 1323, 1328 n.19, 1329 (1952). The Civil Rights Act was
then reenacted in 1870 pursuant to the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
It appeared in its present form in the 1874 codification of federal law. Although many lower
courts at that time held that the rights afforded under the Act would be protected only if state
action were involved, the Supreme Court has decided that the Act maintained its original
character under the thirteenth amendment. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976).
Hence, the Act protects against individual discriminatory action. Id. See generally Gressman,
supra, at 1328-29.
1 Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see also Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
1 Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982); cf. United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 intended to protect citizens of
United States from discrimination stemming from race, color, or previous condition of servitude).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
' McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976); cf. CONC. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866) (bill applies to persons of "every race and color") (statement of
Sen. Trumbull), quoted in Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
8 Compare Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1975) (Indian
plaintiffs, as distinct group, may maintain action under § 1981) with Martinez v. Hazelton
Research Animals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186, 187-88 (D. Md. 1977) (Hispanic plaintiff cannot
maintain § 1981 action based on allegation of racial discrimination suffered because of Hispanic
background, even though discrimination based on Hispanic origin closely resembles racial
discimination).
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Illustrative of the modern controversy is the case of Ortiz v. Bank
of America.9 Carman R. Ortiz, a woman of Puerto Rican descent,
filed a complaint against Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association (Bank of America) in the Superior Court of California,
Placer County, on February 2, 1981.10 Although employed by the
bank for seventeen years, Ortiz alleged that she had been denied a
promotion and was subsequently fired from her position of clerk
2
because of her national origin and accent." She claimed, inter alia,1
that the discriminatory action taken by her employer violated section
1981.13
The action was removed by the defendant to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California. Defendants then
moved to dismiss alleging, in part, that the plaintiff, Ortiz, failed to
state a cause of action under section 1981.14 Specifically, Bank of
America contended that the complaint should be dismissed' 5 because
the scope of section 1981 was only applicable to claims of racial
discrimination; therefore, a claim alleging discrimination based on
6
national origin was not encompassed by the statute.
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.' 7 It found
that construing the complaint in a most favorable light,' 8 the plaintiff
may be able to support her claim of discrimination based on her
9 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
1o Id. at 552 n.2.
1 Id. at 552.
12 Id. In her complaint, Ortiz also claimed that the defendant had violated the

CAL. LAB.

1418(a) (West 1971) (repealed and amended 1977, 1978); CAL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8, §
11345 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOe-200e-17 (1976) (Title VII). 547 F. Supp. at 552. She also
alleged breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
Id. Section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind.
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
1 547 F. Supp. at 552. The defendant also claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction, that
the plaintiff's allegation of emotional distress was barred by the statute of limitations, and that
the DOE allegations and plaintiff's claim for compensatory and punitive damages under Title
VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act should be stricken. Id.
Is Id. at 553. Defendant did not, however, define the meaning of race or national origin. Id.
at 551 n.l.
16 Id. at 553.
1v Id. at 568.
S The court explained that it is the Ninth Circuit's position to allow a plaintiff to continue
with his case "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim." Id. at 552-53 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see
also De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
CODE §
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Puerto Rican descent under section 1981.19 This decision was the
product of an extensive analysis of the meaning of the term "race" as
contained in the Act. Judge Karlton, presiding over the motion, found
that a cause of action under section 1981 exists when the discrimination alleged is based on membership in a group which is perceived as
being distinct from "the group which enjoys the broadest rights"2 0 in
our society, so long as the boundaries of that group are not fixed by
2
sex, age, or religion exclusively. '
Judge Karlton explained that the statute's language, while seemingly clear and broad, 22 had been quite obfuscated by case law which
suggested that Congress intended to limit the statute's breadth.2 3 To
ascertain the proper scope of section 1981 the court determined that
an independent analysis of the statute's legislative history and subse2 4
quent judicial interpretations was indispensible.
Section 1981 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.25 This Act was passed to enforce the protections of the thirteenth

547 F. Supp. at 568.
Id. In a footnote to his decision, Judge Karlton noted that the plaintiffs group "must
• . . be one which is distinctive within the implied statutory taxonomy." Id. at 568 n.28.
21 Id. at 568.
22 Id. at 553-54. Judge Karlton explained that the statute is worded so as to protect "all
persons" and contains no qualifying phrase. He explained that the language of the statute is the
most accurate source of its meaning when that language is clear. Id. at 553-54 (relying on Smith
v. Califano, 597 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1979)).
23 Id. at 554 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (section 1981 in no
way
protects against discrimination based on gender or religion)).
24 Id.
25 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31,
14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. § 1, at 27 (emphasis in original); see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976). The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed by the Senate on February 2, 1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). It was passed by the House of Representatives on March 13, 1866.
Id. at 1367. The bill was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Id. at 1679-81. Both the House
and Senate voted to override the veto and passed the Act. Id. at 1861.
"

2o
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amendment 26 and to nullify the Black Codes enacted following the
Civil War. 27 Obviously, the era in which the Act was passed, as well
as the congressional debates, indicate that the Act was aimed primarily at alleviating the discrimination practiced against the recently
freed black man. 28 Judge Karlton repeatedly emphasized, however,
that the intent of the bill's framers was to secure equal treatment for
all people located within the United States and its territories. 29 He in
fact found that during the course of the congressional debates over the
passing of the Act, the legislators continuously referred to the bill's
application to persons of all races and colors.30 This observation was
supported by Judge Karlton through an examination of an amendment to the bill made in 1866.11 The recommended change, proposed
by Representative Wilson as an amendment to the first draft, led to
the inclusion of the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens. '3 2 Judge
Karlton relied upon comments made by Representative Wilson to

21 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 n.8 (1976). The Act was passed pursuant to
Congress' power under § 2 of the thirteenth amendment. Id, at 179; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). Section 2 reads: "Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
27 547 F. Supp. at 554. Most of the southern states enacted statutes (Black Codes) which
effectively forced recently freed Negroes to work as slaves although their freedom had, in fact,
been guaranteed by the Constitution. Cressman, supra note 3, at 1325. The Black Codes denied
blacks the right to bear arms, the right to travel, and the right to be educated. Comment,
Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32, 39 (1980). The
southern Negro was, "socially an outcast, industrially a serf, legally a separate and oppressed
class." Gressman, supra note 3, at 1325 (quoting J. TENBROECK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIcINS OF ThE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 163 (1951); see infra note 29. Immediately after the thirteenth amendment was passed the need for enforcement legislation was obvious because "[w]idespread atrocities against the free Negroes and their white friends continued in the South." Gressman, supra
note 3, at 1325.
28 547 F. Supp. at 554. President Andrew Johnson, in an official report, stated that the
South, through its Black Codes, was intending to maintain the prior slave status of blacks.
Comment, supra note 27, at 40.
21 547 F. Supp. at 554.
30 Id.; see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lane) ("[the
former slaves] are free by the constitutional amendment lately enacted and entitled to all
privileges and immunities of other free citizens of the United States").
Judge Karlton explained that the bill was introduced by Senator Trumbull of Illinois as a
bill "to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights." 547 F. Supp. at 554 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866)). He further noted that Senator Trumbull
referred to the bill as being applicable to "every race and color." Id.; see CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 601 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Hendricks) ("The bill provides, in the first place,
that the civil rights of all men, without regard to color, shall be equal").
31 547 F. Supp. at 555.
32 Id. Judge Karlton used the words of Representative Wilson to explain: "'It was thought by
some persons that unless these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might
be extended to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors." Id. (remarks of Rep.

Wilson) (quoting CONG.

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1866)).
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conclude that the phrase was incorporated into the bill in order to
limit the Act's coverage so that certain groups could not claim protection.3 3 The judge concluded that the qualifying phrase should not be
34
read to foster distinctions between race and national origin.
Judge Karlton, however, found that this phrase had been interpreted by the Supreme Court as emphasizing the racial character of
the protection afforded. 3 5 He cited to the decision of McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 36 wherein the Court interpreted

the amendment as an indication that Congress intended the bill to
protect against racial discrimination as opposed to discrimination
against women and minors.3 7 While the McDonald Court noted that
the statute was not meant only to protect blacks, it failed to further
detail what groups do qualify for protection under the Act. 38
Judge Karlton concluded that the words of section 1981, although initially conceived to protect the emancipated black man,39
were also passed with the intent to protect all groups (except those
based on gender, age, or religion) from discriminatory acts. 40 He then
turned to Supreme Court precedent construing the parameters of
section 1981. Little insight, however, was revealed concerning the
meaning of "race" 4' because the Supreme Court, although confronted
with a number of controversies concerning the scope of section 1981,42
had never heard a case in which the racial status of the claimant was
43
in dispute.
Id.; see supra note 32.
547 F. Supp. at 555. The amendment did not indicate that the bill was meant to protect
only black men. Id. While this amendment has been interpreted to emphasize the "racial
character," see supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, it
should be noted that congressional debates concerning the passage of the Act in 1866 made little
distinction between race and national origin. Freed slaves were referred to as those of African
descent as well as blacks. 547 F. Supp. at 555 n.6. (relying on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 288 n.19 (1976)).
" 547 F. Supp. at 555-56.
3" 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
37 Id. at 293. The Court held that the amendment was meant to emphasize the racial
character of the bill and not to limit its application to nonwhites. Id.
38 Id.; see Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1965) (limiting the scope of the 1866 Act
only in terms of racial equality).
" See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
" 547 F. Supp. at 555.
41 Id. at 556.
" See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Hodges
v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
4' 547 F. Supp. at 556 (citing McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287; Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)); see, e.g., Georgia v.Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966)
(Court noted that Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to extend rights to protect racial equality
and that this category of rights is limited, but gave no definition of "race").
33
3'
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The Court held in McDonald that section 1981 extends its protection to white persons as well as nonwhites.14 Through an extensive
review of the statute's legislative history, the Court determined that
the statute must be construed with regard to the intent of its framers. 4"
This intent, it was found, was to extend equal treatment to "all men,
without regard to color." 46 The Court, however, stopped short of
deciding on a criteria under which claims of discrimination not based
solely on the plaintiffs color would be actionable. Similarly, the
Court in Johnson v. Railway ExpressAgency 47 stated conclusively that
without any
section 1981 provides a remedy for racial discrimination
48
further discussion of the scope of such protection.
After scrutinizing these applicable Supreme Court decisions,
Judge Karlton focused on a series of cases decided in the Ninth Circuit
to aid in defining the term "race" within the statutory context. 49 He
found that the Ninth Circuit, although it had been confronted with
the issue a number of times, failed to deal adequately with the controversy 50 as none of the cases reviewed by Judge Karlton contained any
discussion of the definition of "race" in connection with the scope of
section 1981.51 Judge Karlton explained that the court of appeals
repeatedly found ways to fit claims made by those who believed they
were the victims of discrimination into the parameters of section 1981
by finding an element of racial discrimination in each case. 52 For
example, in Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Engineering, Inc. ,5 the
court decided that although the plaintiff, a Mexican-American, alleged discrimination based on national origin in his complaint, such
discrimination could be actionable under section 1981.54 The court
reasoned that since Mexican-Americans may have skin color that is not
11 427 U.S. at 296.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 289 n.20 (quoting CONC.
Hendricks, an opponent to the bill)).
41

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 601 (remarks of Sen.

421 U.S. 454 (1975).

11 Id. at 459-60.
11 547 F. Supp. at 557.
10 See id. at 557-58.
-" Id.; see Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979) (Mexican-American permitted cause of action based on complaint alleging national original discrimination); Sethy v. Alameda City Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (brownskinned person of East Indian descent has cognizable claim); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522
F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1975) (court in determining that statute prohibits private racial
discrimination, allowed Indian plaintiff cause of action).
-1 547 F. Supp. at 557-58; see supra note 51; see also Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566
F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
5'597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979).
5 Id. at 1299-1300.
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characteristically caucasian, they could maintain an action based on
racial discrimination. 55 Since no guidance existed in the Ninth Circuit
under which the present case could be decided, the court turned to
nonbinding authority from other jurisdictions.
Upon inspection of other jurisdictions, the court found three
major approaches which dominated judicial thought on the scope of
section 1981. Courts advocating the first approach require that a
plaintiff allege he belongs to a racial classification other than white to
maintain an action against a white defendant. 56 It then follows that
section 1981 provides no protection to a person who claims discrimination based on national origin. 57 Illustrative of this view is Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp. 58 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to permit Spanish surnamed individuals to join in a claim in which black plaintiffs were
seeking relief under section 1981. 5' The statute's origins 0 and its
judicial history, 6' concluded the court, showed that section 1981 applied to discrimination based on race or alienage, 2 and therefore, did
not prohibit discrimination based "on national origin, religion, sex, or
6 3
other human characteristics."
11 Id. at 1300. The court found that the plaintiff suffered discrimination because of his
brown skin color. Id.
56 547 F. Supp. at 560.
11 Id. at 560 & n.17. Some courts in this category require the complaint to allege racial
discrimination specifically as a basis for a § 1981 claim. Id. at 560 n. 17 (citing National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd mnem., 556 F.2d 76
(D.C. Cir. 1977)). Thus, only claims based on strict racial discrimination are actionable. Id. at
560. Courts conclude that when whites allege discrimination by other whites, the claim is not
racial, but rather based on national origin, and therefore, not cognizable under § 1981. Id.; see
Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic Center, 467 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Minn.
1979) (person of Ukranian descent could not be protected from discrimination by caucasian
under § 1981); Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (although
people of Puerto Rican descent are victims of discrimination similar to racial discrimination, it is,
in fact, not racial in character and no § 1981 action may therefore be maintained). The Vera
court, however, never confronted the question of what may be included in the term "race."
-868 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
11 Id. at 10. The court found that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens," which was
added to § 1 of the 1866 Act was meant to emphasize the racial character of the Act. Id. at 12.
The court then, with no discussion of the scope of the term "racial character" except for a
statement holding that discrimination based on racial character is treatment which distinguishes
the victim from white citizens, found that a Spanish surnamed invididual could not bring a suit
based on § 1981. Id. at 10-12.
1 See supra note 59.
81 68 F.R.D. at 11 (relying upon Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) and
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966)).
81 68 F.R.D. at 13.
"3 Id. at 14. Because whites, as well as nonwhites, may be subject to discrimination for these
characteristics, private discrimination based on these factors is not proscribed by statute. Id. at
15.
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Judge Karlton found that the reasoning set forth in United Gas
had been followed by courts advocating this first approach. 4 He
criticized this line of reasoning, however, by pointing out that although these courts require a claim to be based on racial discrimination, they never fully define race. 65 In the court's opinion, these cases
followed a haphazard method of analyzing a complaint brought under section 1981, which led only to "unarticulated and suppressed"
definitions of race. 66 Judge Karlton concluded that judicial decisions
were therefore based upon faulty, unsupportable premises.6 7
In contrast, the second approach allows a plaintiff of a certain
ethnic group to bring a cause of action based on section 1981 so long as
the plaintiff alleges an element of racial discrimination. 68 The complainant then bears the burden of producing evidence to show racial,
as opposed to solely ethnic, discrimination. 9 The courts in this second
group recognize the difficulty in attempting to distinguish between
14 See 547 F. Supp. at 560; see also Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp.
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, modified in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); supra note 57 and accompanying text.
15

547 F. Supp. at 560.

Id. This method is illustrated by Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786
(W.D. Pa. 1977). In Budinsky, the district court concluded that Hispanics may claim protection
pursuant to § 1981 since they have been traditionally subject to discrimination, but that persons
of Slavic or Jewish origins cannot since they are not frequently subject to racial discrimination.
Id. at 787. This conclusion is specious since the court offered no rationale or basis for its finding.
This harsh result is somewhat ameliorated, however, since the court observed that a different
result might have been reached had Title VII relief been unavailable. Id. at 788-89. One
prominent writer, Dr. Thomas Gossett, finds the continued persecution of Jews akin to modern
racism. Jews, according to Gossett, were regarded "as loathsome creatures who had bad physical, mental, and moral characteristics which they apparently inherited and passed on to their
descendants." T. GossErr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 11 (1963).
67 547 F. Supp. at 560. Judge Karlton referred to S. MOLNAR, RACES: TYPES & ETHNIC
GROUPS 12 (1975) to explain that these faulty notions of the term race are based on contradictory
and vague ideas. 547 F. Supp. at 560 n. 18. According to Molnar, each person's conception of the
word "race" is wrongly assumed to be based on some scientific fact. S. MOLNAR, supra at 12; see
547 F. Supp. at 560 n. 18. Although many courts find that Spanish surnamed individuals have no
cause of action under § 1981 based on the judge's particular notion of the meaning of race, many
scientists who attempt to classify human beings according to races find Ladino or Hispanics, to
be one of the thirty types of racial classifications. 547 F. Supp. at 561 n.18 (relying on C. COON,
S. GARN & J. BIRDSELL, RACES: A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF RACE FORMATION IN MAN 138
(1950)).
66 547 F.
Supp. at 561. Courts in this category require plaintiffs to amend complaints
alleging national origin discrimination in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. See
Saad v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978); Apodaca v. General Electric
Co., 445 F. Supp. 821, 823-24 (D.N.M. 1978); Martinez v. Hazelton Research Animals, Inc.,
430 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Md. 1977).
6 547 F. Supp. at 561; see Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. 11. 1982)
wherein the court, although acknowledging that Hispanics have suffered discrimination closely
akin to that suffered by blacks, decided that Hispanics as a group may not maintain an action
under § 1981 but that individual Hispanics may allege racial discrimination under the Act based
on their nonwhite appearance. Id. at 796.
66
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racial and national origin discrimination. 70 For example, in Bullard v.
Omi Georgia, Inc. ,71 the Fifth Circuit court determined that the
differences between national origin and racial discrimination were so
discrete that trial evidence would be necessary to decide whether a
cause of action under section 1981 was present. 72 The Bullard court
acknowledged that a case may arise in which the difference between
the two types of discrimination are so closely related as to be indistinguishable. 73 While most courts in this second category recognized a
distinction between race and national origin discrimination, Judge
Karlton noted that none clearly defined the term "race. ' 74 Accordingly, Judge Karlton concluded that the second approach was as
inadequate as the first in delineating any attempt to determine the
7
scope of section 1981. 5
The third approach which the court analyzed makes no attempt
to define race in a technical sense since the courts use the notion of
race in a practical manner and repeatedly find no line of demarcation
between race and national origin. 76 Such a view abandons all search
for a static definition of race and instead permits a cause of action
under section 1981 based on national origin as well as race and
alienage. 77 In Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 the Court of
70 547 F. Supp. at 561. These courts do, however, recognize that some distinction exists and

the plaintiff must meet the burden of proving "racial animus" as the motivating factor for the
discrimination. Id. (citing Comment, supra note 27, at 89).
7 640 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1981).
72 Id. at 634.
73 Id.
7' 547 F. Supp. at 561. Although the difficulty of differentiating between race and national
origin is recognized by courts in the second category, Judge Karlton found that most of these
courts place the burden of proving racial discrimination on the plaintiff. Id. at 561-62.
71 Id. at 562.
71 Id. Scientists finding that pigmentation is too variable to be meaningful in defining
race
have tried to base racial classifications on blood types, skull measurements, and skull shapes. Id.
at 562 n.19. The court maintained that such data would be irrelevant with respect to § 1981
claims since it would not aid in protecting people against invidious discrimination. Id. Judge
Karlton then explained that a fourth, even more liberal, category may exist. Id. This approach
espoused by Judge Kane in LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo.
1978), finds no need to even address the controversy surrounding the meaning of race. This view,
instead, finds any attempt to classify race a futile, confusing exercise. The LaFore court found
that § 1981 is meant to protect all persons from discrimination. Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
Judge Karlton found that although the LaFore court made an important contribution to the
controversy surrounding the definition of "race," the decision was too broad, based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976), wherein the Court
held that the scope of § 1981 did not include protection for gender, age, or religious based
claims. 547 F. Supp. at 562 n.20.
7' 547 F. Supp. at 562. Courts within the third category all deal with the racial character
found in the statute, yet vary in approach. Some courts look at whether the plaintiff is part of an
identifiable group which is distinguishable from white persons while others look only at whether
the discrimination is based on racial perception. Id.
78 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979), cited in 547 F. Supp. at 563-64.

772

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:763

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit allowed a plaintiff of Mexican-American descent to claim the protection of section 1981 although recognizing that the section was meant to protect against racial discrimination. 79 The court opined that it was not essential for race to be given a
technical meaning. 0 It reasoned that prejudice is a product of attitude
in a community and that it is often based on a misconception of race."'
The Manzanares court stated: "[D]efendants may be poor anthropologists, but the prejudice is asserted to be directed against plaintiff in
contrast to the Anglos. This in our view is sufficient. [This] is the
equivalent to the 'all persons' compared to 'white citizens' " discrimination contemplated by § 1981 ."82 Thus, Judge Karlton adopted this
third theory, finding an "identifiable group" 83 standard to conform to
8 4
both the modern social realities and the original legislative intent.
This dynamic approach has gained significant credibility in the fed85
eral courts.
Although a number of cases existed upon which a decision in
favor of Ortiz's right to sue could be based, Judge Karlton saw a need
to proceed with his analysis.86 Continued discussion was necessary
because his investigation of prior law failed to provide a proper defini87
tion or analysis of the term "race" for purposes of the statute.
Judge Karlton maintained that no "immutable category" of race
existed. 88 A definition of "race" is only valid when the reason for the
71 593 F.2d at 970.

1o Id. The Manzanares court reasoned that since § 1981 is designed to afford all persons the
rights afforded white citizens, and the statute itself makes no mention of race, national origin, or
alienage; the measure is group to group. In the Manzanares case, the plaintiff alleged that the
group to which he belonged was Mexican-American and his rights should be measured against
the group termed "Anglos." Id.
1' Id. at 971. The court held that § 1981 is particularly aimed at racial discrimination, but
that the term "race" should not have a restrictive definition. Id.
82 Id.
11 547 F. Supp. at 564. Judge Karlton adopted the "group to group" measure implemented
by the Manzanarescourt thereby labeling it an "identifiable group" standard. Id. at 564 (relying
on Manzanares, 593 F.2d at 970).
84 Id. "Thus it extends § 1981's protections to those persons who today are members of groups
that, like the then recently freed slaves, are in a position far from equal to that of the majority,
historically 'white persons."' Id.
85 Id. at 563-64. This approach was first announced in Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works,
425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977) and has since been supported by commentators like
Greenfield & Kates, MEXICAN AMERICANS, RACIAL DIscRIMINATION, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1866, 63 CAL. L. REv. 662 (1975) and Comment, supra note 27, at 89-90.
86 547 F. Supp. at 564-65. Judge Karlton explained that although the legislative history and
case law suggests that the plaintiff had a cause of action, he saw a need to illustrate why race
cannot be given a static, objective meaning. Id.
17 Id. at 565.
88 Id. Although no immutable category exists the judge explained that differences in human
characteristics provide a basis for the classification. Id.
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classification is revealed.8 9 Classification of race then is necessarily
based on the perception of he who is making the categorization. 90
Race, therefore, is not static; rather, " 'history, in the biological as
well as the cultural senses, is always in motion.' "91
As a result of the foregoing determinations, Judge Karlton found
that a definition of "race" is necessary to differentiate it from "national origin." 92 Great difficulties, however, exist in the casting of
such a meaning. According to scientific thought, race is a human
grouping "which is culturally defined in a given society." '9 3 Therefore,
the meaning of race is closely linked to the geographical and cultural
distinctions among people, attributes traditionally associated with
national origin.9 4 It then follows that no scientific explanation could
95
differentiate race and national origin.
The Ortiz court determined that no common meaning of race can
be substituted to fulfill the purpose of section 1981 .96 Judge Karlton
maintained that racial classifications have shifted over the course of

81 Id. (relying on C. COON, supra note 67, at 140; S.MOLNAR, supra note 67, at 13). After a
group of scientists developed a list of 30 races, they emphasized that the number of races could be
narrowed to 10 or widened to 50. S. MOLNAR, supra note 67, at 13. According to Judge Karlton,
this demonstrated that race is an evolving notion. 547 F. Supp. at 565; see G. SIMPSON & J.
YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES:

AN ANALYSIS

OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

(1965). Simpson and Yinger point out that there exists thousands of definitions for the word
"race." In the Middle Ages, the nobility of Europe considered themselves a separate race from
the common people. Id. at 37. Supposedly the nobility was descended from the Germanic
ancestors and the commoners were descended from the Celts and Romans. Id. Another example
of a racial definition is seen in Adolf Hitler's book, Mein Kampj, wherein it is stated by Hitler
that there exists three categories of human race: the "founders, maintainers, and destroyers of
culture-the Aryan stock alone can be considered as representing the first category." Id. at 38. In
addition to this "mystical" conception of race, the authors point out that there also exists
administrative concepts of race established by bureaucratic action, id. at 38-39, and biological
concepts of race which vary from a traditional view based on skin color to endocrine theories
based on the thyroid gland. Id. at 39-54; see also J. BARZUN, RACE: A STUDY IN SUPERSTITION 1-16
(1965).
" 547 F. Supp. at 566. No single element can be used to classify people into racial categories.
S. MOLNAR, supra note 67, at 95.
" 547 F. Supp. at 565 (quoting C. CooN, supra note 67, at 140).
91 Id. at 565.
93 Id.
" Id. at 566. "Common territory and point in space" are necessary to determine classifications. Id. (quoting S. MOLNAR, supra note 27, at 14). Further, Judge Karlton noted that human
varieties are more mixed than animal or plant forms and there is a significant integration
between groups. Id. (relying on A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH 92 (1964)).
95 Id.
11 Id. at 566-67. Judge Karlton demonstrated this point by using the definition of "race"
found in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 187 (1976). The dictionary gives a
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history and have concomitantly shifted the focus of prejudices over
time. 7 This evolutionary concept indicates the dynamics of the notion
of race-a notion that changes with both time and locality whether
one looks to history, anthropology, biology, or community standards.9 8 Section 1981 then, being defined by the Supreme Court as a
statute designed to protect against racial discrimination, 9 must also
be dynamic. 100
Judge Karlton resolved the issue in this motion to dismiss by
holding that a dynamic, adaptable meaning of race is essential in
deciding whether a plaintiff has a cognizable claim under section
1981.101 Such a definition requires that a plaintiff need only allege
that he is a member of "a group composed of both men and women,
the boundaries of which are not fixed by age or exclusively by religious
faith, and which is of a character that it is or may be perceived as
distinct when measured against the group which enjoys the broadest
rights." 102 The judge then determined that in the present controversy,
Ortiz, a woman of Puerto Rican descent, could possibly prove she was
a member of a group protected by section 1981.103 Accordingly, the
court decided that the complaint was sufficient to survive the motion
104
to dismiss.
The flexible approach adopted by the Ortiz court is a practical
solution to the problem of statutory interpretation which has plagued

lengthy definition, but concludes that all technical definitions of the term are controversial and
lead to confusion and misuse. Id.
17 547 F. Supp. at 567. The judge noted that discrimination could be found even in the Hall
Dynasty (3rd century B.C.). During this period the ancient Chinese invaders of India, using
pigmentation as a distinguishable characteristic, differentiated themselves from blonde, lighteyed barbarians who resembled monkeys. Id. (citing T. GossE=r, supra note 66, at 4). Judge
Karlton pointed out that although black people have been the most consistent object of discrimination in the United States, discrimination has also been practiced against "almost every immigrant (and native) group . . . [throughout] this country's intellectual history." Id.
91 Id. The court observed that the notion of race throughout the history of the nation has
been only a means to practice discrimination. Id.
" See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
100 547 F. Supp. at 567. Indeed, although the Supreme Court has said religious discrimination
is not a basis for a § 1981 claim, it does not follow that Jews, as a distinct racial group could not
bring an action within the scope of § 1981. Id. at 567 n.25. But see Budinsky v. Corning Glass
Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
101547 F. Supp. at 567.
102 Id. at 568.
103 Id.
104 Id.; cf. Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 857 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff's
complaint survived motion to dismiss since under civil rights action, liberal standard in favor of
plaintiff is applied), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
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section 1981 for over one hundred years. The confusion, which finds
its basis in the statute's legislative history, stems not from an ambiguity in the language used, but rather from the underlying meaning
those words may suggest, especially when viewed in the context of a
growing, changing nation.
The Supreme Court has concluded that the statute's words were
chosen by its framers so as to provide a protection against racial
05
discrimination;
yet, the statute makes no mention of the word
'
"race. 106 Indeed, section 1981 provides that "all persons . . . shall
have the same right[s] . .. as is enjoyed by white citizens."10 7 This
standard established by the language of the Act, provides a measure
against which a group claiming discrimination may be assessedwhite citizens. It also clearly states that all persons are entitled to its
protection. At first glance then, the statute would appear to provide
protection to any person who has been denied rights afforded to the
group enjoying the broadest range of rights, traditionally, white citizens.
Under this standard, national origin discrimination as well as
discrimination grounded on race could be actionable.10 8 The United
States District Court for the District of Colorado in LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co.'0 9 followed such an approach, rejecting any
interpretation of section 1981 which included the term "race."" 0
Although the court recognized that the statute does serve to prohibit
racial discrimination,"' it refused to define the statute in terms of
race. 1 2 The court declared that "[e]quating, 'white citizens' with a
racial classification is utterly lacking in sophistication" 113 and therefore found the statute to afford all people the same rights as that group
114
enjoying the broadest spectrum of rights.

105 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1965); accord McDonald, 427 U.S. at 285; Runyon

v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459.
106 See supra note 13.
107 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
10 Id. The statute makes no distinction between race and national origin. See id.
109448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo. 1978).

"I Id. at 826. The court found any analysis of the statute based on race to be "unproductive."
Id.
I id.
112 Id.
113

Id.

The court explained that no scientific basis existed that would adequately define race

within the confines of the statute. Id.
"I Id. This standard, set by the LaFore court, is conspicuously similar to the standard used by
the Ortiz court. See s-upra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. The LaForecourt, while quick
to criticize the Ortiz approach as found in Manzanares, 448 F. Supp. at 825-26, failed to realize
that the standard it employed differed only in semantics. Ortiz and Manzanares both used the
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Although the LaFore court construed the words of section 1981
in a straightforward, sensible manner, the court failed to reconcile its
interpretation of the section's parameters with precedent clearly indicating that section 1981 is a statute aimed at protecting against racial
discrimination.1 5 The LaFore court simply dismissed any racial interpretation of the statute by finding an attempt to define race and apply
it in a legal context questionable and "fraught with peril." ' ,
A better alternative to LaFore's disregard for precedent is found
in Ortiz.1 7 The Ortiz court recognized the danger of a preconceived,
static notion of race and yet successfully fit a reasonable, workable
alternative into the well-established framework of the statute as defined by the Supreme Court." 8 Judge Karlton, conducting an independent analysis of the section's legislative history, concluded that the
incorporation of the phrase "white citizens" intended to exclude
women and minors" 9 yet in no way was meant to suggest any other
exclusionary criteria. 20 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the
legislative intent in 1866 was subject to ambiguity, and therefore, it
elected to define the statute's scope within the framework previously
2
established by the Supreme Court.' '
While the Supreme Court has decided that section 1981 was
devised as a protection against discrimination based on race. 22 Ortiz
correctly pointed out that the term "race" has never been limited by
the Court.' 23 The Ortiz court then arrived at a broad, workable
definition of race by analyzing, and in turn eliminating, the possible
sources from which a static definition, containing immutable catego-

term race in a dynamic manner which allowed for a group to group analysis. See supra notes 7885 and accompanying text. The LaFore court, in reality, employed the same standard as the
Ortiz court, using the term "identifiable class" instead of "race." See 448 F. Supp. at 826.
"1 448 F. Supp. at 826.
116

Id.

The Ortiz court noted the difficulty in wholeheartedly accepting LaFore because the
LaFore court chose to disregard the Supreme Court's holding in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 167 (1976). See 547 F. Supp. at 562 n.20. Instead, the LaFore court chose to redefine the
protection afforded by the statute through a strict construction of its words. See supra notes 10914 and accompanying text.
Iii
547 F. Supp. at 565.
11 Id. at 555.
120 Id. Judge Karlton explained that by "incorporating a racial concept the Supreme Court has
"

incorporated a flexible and changing concept." Id. at 567.
I" See id. at 555-56.
122 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
t23547 F. Supp. at 556. The reason the Court has never explained the meaning of race as used
in the statute is because the Court has always considered cases in which the people claiming
protection were those who fit squarely within the statute's meaning as evidenced by its legislative
history (i.e., blacks and whites). Id.
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ries, could be drawn. 124 Relying upon anthropology, biology, and
history, the court discovered that no valid, definitive meaning of race
could be invoked. 25 Judge Karlton noted, however, that vast inconsistencies existed between the static concept of race invoked by prior
courts and the treatment of race in the scientific community. 2 While
courts have refused to allow a cause of action under section 1981 when
the plaintiff has alleged only national origin discrimination as opposed
to racial discrimination, 1 27 scientific thought has actually defined race
in terms of geographic origin and cultural ties-ideas commonly asso2 8
ciated with national origin.1
Moreover, the court found any commonly defined notion of race
equally inadequate since this, too, is highly variable.' 9 As an alternative, the court elected to use a definition of race which would allow a
plaintiff to maintain a cause of action when he can show membership
in a group which has been denied rights which members of the most
30
favored group enjoy. 1
The definition employed by Ortiz is a viable alternative to the
static, conclusory definitions used by other courts in an attempt to
blindly follow Supreme Court precedent. A dynamic definition of the
parameters of race respects precedent yet recognizes the practical need
for expanding the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 so as to allow
all people who suffer discrimination based on their group affiliation a
remedy. Certainly the framers of the 1866 Act, acknowledging a need
to protect Chinese immigrants, as well as emancipated blacks,' 3 ' had
no intention of precluding from the Act's protection, groups who
2
would later enter this country in search of equality.13

114

Id. at 565-67.

125

Id.

at 567. The Ortiz court concluded that no scientific meaning of race existed, id. at 566,

and further, that no commonly accepted meaning could be substituted. Id. at 567.
126

Id. at 566.

12

See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
547 F. Supp. at 566; see also supra note 89.

12'

129 547 F. Supp. at 567.
30
't

12

Id. at 568; accord LaFore, 448 F. Supp. at 826.
Greenfield & Kates, supra note 85, at 673-74; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
The drafters of the bill make no mention of any exclusionary criteria except that of women

and minors. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even if the framers of the
bill did not mean to confer upon the people of the United States a general protection against
discrimination, a liberal interpretation should be given the Reconstruction Congress' legislation.
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191. "If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if
the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission,
the hands of their successors." Id. (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
149 (1921) (emphasis in original)); see also Comment, supra note 27, at 69.
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The Supreme Court now has the responsibility of acknowledging
the sound premise of the Ortiz approach. A uniform method analyzing the problem of discrimination protected by section 1981 is long
overdue. A statute, based on the landmark amendment which abolished slavery and badges of servitude 33 needs to be interpreted consistently with a keen sensitivity to societal mores. Section 1981 should
not be subject to a constrained definition allowing only blacks a
remedy. A dynamic definition of race, which would force the factfinder to undertake an inquiry that would reveal whether the plaintiff
has, in fact, been denied rights which the group exercising the broadest rights enjoyed is imperative if such groups are to enjoy the benefits
of equality bestowed on the people of this country more than one
hundred years ago.
Julie Colin

131

See supra note 1.

